Introduction

Access agreements have been a well established part of international commercial diplomacy and foreign relations for decades. Until recently however, fisheries access agreements were not viewed as subject to the network of rules governing international trade as set out in the treaties associated with the World Trade Organisation. This has now changed.

Since 1999, an argument has been advanced by a powerful coalition of countries, including the United States, that it is now necessary to subject all aspects of access agreements (access fees paid; development assistance granted; other measures) to the disciplines of international trade law as set out in the WTO treaties. The most important result of this change in perspective is that it is now generally agreed that the financial arrangements associated with access agreements must be closely assessed to consider whether they constitute a subsidy – typically a subsidy to the fleets of the Distant-Water Fishing Nation. With respect to subsidies, the most important WTO argument is that such subsidies where they exist, contribute significantly to: (1) production and trade distortions in international trade; (2) overfishing. Provided that all the States concerned are members of the WTO, the WTO rules or disciplines allow any country which considers that it has suffered harm in international trade from a subsidy to seek dispute settlement under the WTO framework. They also have a right to take retaliatory trade measures under certain circumstances.

Reflecting the changed view of access agreements, current WTO negotiations (known as the Doha Round) are currently negotiating the specific form that new trade rules restricting and prohibiting fisheries subsidies should take. These new rules will then be added to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-Measures. Access agreements have come under intense scrutiny during these negotiations and it is now accepted that access agreements will have to be significantly re-organised to make them compatible with WTO rules. In particular, it is now strongly argued that Governments (for example the European Union) should no longer pay access fees to Coastal State governments on behalf of their national operators fishing in Coastal State waters, unless those fisheries are extremely well-managed. This is because this type of government-to-government transfer is arguably a subsidy which distorts international trade even though it is given to the Coastal State government rather than directly to the national companies concerned. The argument now is that such companies should pay all access fees themselves rather than gain subsidized benefits from another party paying such fees on their behalf. This change in perspective has significant implications for the SRFC countries given their high level of dependence on the revenue from access fees. The new situation requires structural adjustment at the level of the economy, in the area of fisheries policy and with respect to access agreements. Current agreements will also need to be reviewed to make them WTO compatible whilst new types of access agreements will also have to be negotiated.

Finally, other aspects of international trade also pose challenges, both negative and positive to the future use of access agreements by SRFC Member Countries. The challenges in question derive principally from the implementation of non-traditional initiatives to improve marine management, many of which are based on economic, commercial or market reputation concepts. Thus resources caught under access agreements in the region now have to increasingly address the requirements of

1. trade and catch documentation schemes to control IUU fishing (ICCAT's catch documentation schemes for various tuna);
2. eco-certification and eco-labelling initiatives to encourage improved fisheries management (e. g the Marine Stewardship Council initiative);
3. government traceability requirements responding to health or terrorism concerns (EU regulations requiring that origin of catch be provided on products;
4. United States laws requiring origin to be stated to prevent bio-terrorism);
5. private sector traceability requirements responding to health and product quality concerns.

There is also the intensified use of rules of origin to channel and structure international trade in fish. The issues here are diverse. Basically SRFC countries need to have the analytical capacity to determine on a case by case basis whether these initiatives are (1) technical barriers to trade (TBT) and thus challengeable under the WTO rules; or (2) whether they constitute areas of market opportunity which may legitimately be taken up under the new wave of access and trade agreements.

Issue-problem

The principal problem is that stakeholders in the region (both public and private) currently have a limited understanding of the range of likely impacts of WTO and other trade developments on access agreements. Currently, trade policy in the fisheries sector does not address these matters. They are also ignored in negotiation policy and practice, which tends to focus principally, if not exclusively, on the access fee or compensation to be gained under agreements. Due to a lack of information and understanding, it appears that countries are not exploring new policies to respond to the changed stakes and challenges. In particular, there is an absence of the fundamental understanding of this complex area which will provide the capacity for negotiators and policy-makers to make flexible and appropriate responses to the emergence of these issues within the access agreements context.

Objective

To achieve a rapid improvement in institutional capacity to anticipate and respond to WTO and other global trade developments. The objective is to secure a practical regional/national understanding of the interaction between WTO developments and current/future access agreements. This is to be achieved through studies and seminars focused on the needs and realities of the region. It is expected that the much improved understanding of WTO and other trade-related issues will lead to flexibility of response by decision-makers and economic actors and lead to more sustainable trade and economic arrangements being negotiated with foreign government, and where relevant, private partners.

Approach

The proposed approach comprises two components:

• 1. A background research study closely specifying the challenge that WTO and other trade issues pose to SRFC countries. To be relevant to the needs of the region, the research study will focus closely on the specific marine commodities of relevance to the region, rather than adopt a generic approach. Alternatives and effective ways to respond will also be identified.
• 2. Capacity building at the level of key policy makers and negotiators through:
  • a. non-technical handbook on WTO and related issues in SRFC fisheries agreements and trade for use by negotiators and policy-makers during the various stages of the agreements cycle: pre-negotiation preparation; negotiations and drafting of agreements; post-signature review ;
  • b. 1 two-day seminar on WTO and related issues in SRFC fisheries agreements and trade concentrating specifically on marine commodity circuits of relevance to the region. The workshop will be targeted at key policy-makers in both the public and private sectors in the region. The handbook will be distributed at this workshop.
  • c. Broader public sensitization through the preparation and distribution of 5 briefing papers on WTO and related issues in SRFC fisheries agreements and trade.

Expected Results

Sub-regional institutional capacity to anticipate and respond to WTO and other global trade developments considerably strengthened and based on sound region-specific concerns, options and possibilities. The opportunities provided within the framework of international trade law will be understood and SRFC members will be enabled to integrate relevant provisions into their fisheries agreements.